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Introduction
Inspiration for this article came from an invitation by the editor of Indonesia to one 
of us (Gillian Hart) to review Good Times and Bad Times in Rural Java (2002) by Jan 
Breman and Gunawan Wiradi.1 In their volume, the authors engage with the debates 
over the distributional consequences of krismon (krisis moneter, monetary crisis), the 
financial crisis of 1997-98 that wrought economic havoc and toppled the Suharto 
regime. They do so by revisiting two villages on the coastal plain of West Java that they 
and others—notably Yujiro Hayami and Masao Kikuchi,2 and Jonathan Pincus3—had 
studied intensively in the past.
The timing of the invitation to review the book was fortuitous, since Hart was just 
about to return to rural Java after an absence of more than twenty years, together with 
Nancy Peluso, who had not been back since 1992.4 This trip in July 2004 was part of a 
comparative project entitled "New and Resurgent Agrarian Questions in Post-Soeharto
1 We are grateful to Suraya Afiff, Noer Fauzi, and Dianto Bachriadi for their guidance in the field and for 
their comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Denise Leto's editorial assistance was, as always, much 
appreciated.
2 Yujiro, Hayami and Masao Kikuchi, Asian Village Economy at the Crossroads: An Economic Approach to 
Institutional Change (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press; Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1982).
3 Jonathan Pincus, "Review of Good Times and Bad Times in Rural Java: Case Studies of Socio-Economic 
Dynamics in Two Villages Toward the End of the Twentieth Century," Development and Change 34,4 (2003): 
772-74.
4 Hart conducted research in 1975-76 in a village on the north coast of Central Java for her book Power, 
Eabor, and Livelihood (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1986). The results of Peluso's fourteen 
months of field research between 1984 and 1986 in two forest villages of Central Java were published in 
Nancy Peluso, Rich Forests, Poor People: Resource Control and Resistance in Java (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1992).
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Indonesia and Post-Apartheid South Africa," an ongoing collaboration with Suraya 
Afiff and Noer Fauzi in Indonesia, and Lungisile Ntsebeza in South Africa.5 The rise of 
agrarian movements demanding access to land in the era of Reformasi formed the 
central theme of what we called a "traveling workshop." We focused on the SPP 
movement (Serikat Petani Pasundan, Sundanese Peasants' Union) in West Java and its 
relationship to KPA (Konsorsium Pembaruan Agraria, Consortium for Agrarian 
Reform), a national network based in Bandung that advocates for agrarian reform 
agendas.6 We also met with activist student groups in each of the three Pasundan 
districts (Kabupaten Garut, Tasikmalaya, and Ciamis) that support the SPP. The 
highlight of the trip was two days in "Cisau," a West Javanese village in which SPP 
members have occupied a former plantation and part of a state forest tract, torn down 
rubber and cocoa trees, planted bananas, built houses, carved out rice fields, and, 
through the electoral process, taken over village government.7
At the end of the traveling workshop, the two of us (Hart and Peluso) together 
made brief revisits to our former field sites—a teak forest village in the eastern part of 
Central Java where Peluso had worked in the mid-1980s, and Sukodono, a village on 
the north coast of Central Java in which Hart had worked in 1975-76.8 On the trip to 
Sukodono, we were also accompanied by Gunawan Wiradi and Sediono 
Tjondronegoro, senior academics at the Institut Pertanian Bogor (Bogor Agricultural 
Institute), who had been major figures with the Survei Agro Ekonomi (SAE or Agro 
Economic Survey) with which Hart had been affiliated in the 1970s.9
Good Times and Bad Times exemplifies renewed interest in Java in the era of 
Reformasi, or “Transisi,” as many scholar-activists in Indonesia today prefer to call this 
period. From the mid-1980s until the end of the New Order, scholarship in the field of 
agrarian change largely shifted to focus on Indonesian islands outside Java, in part
5 Suraya Afiff and Noer Fauzi are both affiliated with KARSA Institute (Institute of Rural and Agrarian 
Change) in Yogyakarta; Fauzi was also a founding member of KPA and is still active on its board. 
Lungisile Ntsebeza is associate professor of sociology at University of Cape Town, South Africa. Our visit 
to Java in July 2004 was part of a Ford Foundation-funded "Crossing Borders" project at University of 
California, Berkeley, entitled "New and Resurgent Agrarian Questions in Post-Soeharto Indonesia and 
Post-Apartheid South Africa." See Suraya Afiff, Noer Fauzi, Gillian Flart, Lungisile Ntsebeza, and Nancy 
Peluso, "Redefining Agrarian Power: Resurgent Agrarian Movements in West Java, Indonesia,"
http: / / repositories.cdlib.org/cseas/CSEASWP2-05/ for a detailed account of the "traveling workshop." 
See Gillian Hart, Nancy Peluso, and Lungisile Ntsebeza, "Resurgent Agrarian Movements: Land 
Occupations in Java and Comparative Reflections with South Africa" (manuscript, n.d.) for an effort to 
situate the rise of agrarian movements in Java in relation to those in South Africa.
6 The Indonesian word petani translates into English as either "peasant" or "farmer." According to Noer 
Fauzi, members of the Expert Council of KPA and the Teaching Council of SPP discussed how the "petani" 
in "Serikat Petani Pasundan" should be translated into English, given its different political connotations. 
They decided that the term "farmer" encompassed agri-business, to which they saw themselves in 
opposition. The "peasant" connotation connects to a nationalist image of a rural smallholder tied to the 
land, an image deployed by President Sukarno in the immediate post-independence period.
7 "Cisau" is a pseudonym.
8 Due to time constraints, we visited only one of Peluso's villages. Both village visits were very short and 
our comments here are somewhat impressionistic.
9 See Ben White, "Between Apologia and Critical Discourse: Agrarian Transitions and Scholarly 
Engagement in Indonesia," in Social Science and Power in Indonesia, ed. D. Dhakidae and V. Hadiz (Jakarta: 
Equinox, 2004), which places SAE in a larger historical context.
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because of the increasing attention of scholars and activists to the environmental and 
social consequences of the massive "Development" projects proceeding apace in 
Kalimantan, Sumatra, Sulawesi, and "Irian Jaya." These "Outer Islands" were primary 
sites where World Bank and bilateral aid sources funded and implemented projects 
related to transmigration, dam construction, forestry, plantation crops, and coastal 
resources. The tremendous amount of land and other agrarian resources enclosed by 
these projects made "the environment" a critical site of struggle throughout the second 
half of the New Order—and the dispossession of millions of people in the name of 
"environment" or "development" became an important focus of scholarship in the 
social sciences and both local and international activism.10 At the same time (though 
not related only to the fields of agrarian/environmental change), many funding 
sources for doctoral and postdoctoral research explicitly or implicitly favored studies 
located outside Java and Bali.11
In this article, we take Breman and Wiradi's provocative book as a starting point 
from which to revisit long-standing debates about trends in poverty, inequality, and 
social differentiation that have been heavily focused on the lowland rice regions of 
rural Java. The book and its themes have encouraged us to put into comparative 
perspective some of our observations about poverty, livelihoods, differentiation, and 
agrarian movements in upland and forest areas of Java. Drawing on insights from our 
own revisits in mid-2004, we call attention to widely divergent dynamics in different 
regions of Java, and raise questions about the forces that enable and constrain the 
emergence of organized political forces demanding access to land and other resources.
As Anton Lucas and Carol Warren have shown in an important article, these 
mobilizations have enabled the rise of new rural political forces—not only in the form 
of farmers' organizations, but also in the election of members of these organizations to 
important positions in village and district governments as village heads, village council 
members, district officials in the executive branches of government, and district 
parliament members.12 Yet these movements are heavily concentrated in upland 
areas—especially in the Pasundan region of West Java that was the focus of our 
traveling workshop. It is striking that in the very places where differentiation appears 
most extreme (lowland rice villages) and coercive structural controls on access to land 
most heavily fortified (teak forest villages), agrarian activists seeking to redress huge 
inequalities have been unable to gain an effective foothold. One of the leading activists 
in KPA put it this way:
10 This literature has become quite extensive, and a list of relevant works and authors is beyond the scope 
of this paper. A short history of social science scholarship on forests in Southeast Asia is presented in 
Nancy Lee Peluso, Peter Vandergeest, and Lesley Potter, "Social Aspects of Forestry in Southeast Asia: A 
Review of Trends in the Scholarly Literature," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 26 (1995): 196-218. Other 
edited volumes include Phillip Hirsch and Carol Warren, The Politics of Environment in Southeast Asia: 
Resources and Resistance (London: Routledge, 1998) and Michael J. G. Parnwell and Raymond L. Bryant, 
Environmental Change in South-East Asia: People, Politics, and Sustainable Development (London; New York, 
NY: Routledge, 1996).
11 Also during this period, two new international research institutes, CIFOR (Center for International 
Forestry Research) and ICRAF (International Center for Research in Agroforestry) were established in 
Bogor.
12 Anton Lucas and Carol Warren, "The State, the People, and their Mediators: The Struggle over Agrarian 
Law Reform in Post-New Order Indonesia," Indonesia 76 (October 2003): 87-126.
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The bias towards uplands conflict remains central in KPA. We have very limited 
knowledge and ideas about how to change conditions in the lowlands through 
organizing local people. This is our weakness.13
It is with these questions of the regionally uneven character of agrarian 
mobilization in mind that we turn to a review of Breman and Wiradi's book and to 
accounts of our brief return visits to the sites of our earlier research.
Good Times and Bad Times in Rural Java: Debating the Impact of Krismon and 
Beyond
In the immediate wake of the financial meltdown of 1997-98, the International 
Labor Organization (ILO) regional office in Jakarta predicted a massive increase in the 
incidence of poverty in Indonesia. The World Bank and other international agencies 
unleashed a flood of studies that contested these claims by invoking the labor- 
absorptive capacity of the urban informal sector and agriculture. In other words, 
Geertzian forms of poverty sharing—extended, in this more recent incarnation, from 
agriculture to scraping a living from the streets of cities and towns—were allegedly 
acting as protective buffers. Some analysts also maintained that the brunt of the 
economic contraction was being borne by relatively well-educated and better-paid 
workers, and that the boom years had enabled even those in the lowest income strata 
to build up reserves.14
Good Times and Bad Times in Rural Java vehemently disputes this optimistic scenario. 
The prologue, written in the first person by Breman, who delivered it as the "Dies 
Natalis" Address at the Institute for Social Studies in the Hague in 2000, posits four key 
claims: that even prior to krismon official statistics underestimated the magnitude of 
poverty; that the effect of krismon was to intensify poverty and inequality; that poverty 
sharing and other coping mechanisms were being grossly exaggerated; and that 
negative effects of krismon were still being felt in 2000.
In fleshing out these claims, the authors draw on their earlier research to portray 
economic conditions in the two villages in 1989-90, and follow with chapters on the 
impact of krismon in each of the two places between 1998 and 2000. Located on the 
coastal plain of West Java (one in North Subang, the other in East Cirebon), the two 
villages differ in terms of size, density, proximity to Jakarta, and the importance of 
agriculture in the local economy. Yet neither bore any resemblance to the model of a 
"traditional corporate village community" often associated with notions of poverty 
sharing—if indeed they ever had.15
13 Interview with Dianto Bachriadi, July 2004.
14 In addition, dependence on perennial export crops such as coffee, cocoa, and cloves was predicted to 
bode well for upland farmers growing them, a prediction that held true for only a year or so before prices 
on all three dropped precipitously.
15 Notions of poverty sharing made famous by Clifford Geertz, Agricultural Involution (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1963) remain a topic of heated debate in the literature on Java; see for 
example, White, "Between Apologia and Critical Discourse." Breman and Wiradi join with Jonathan 
Pincus (Class, Power, and Agrarian Change: Land and Labor in Rural West Java, [Houndmills, Basingstoke, 
Hampshire: Macmillan Press; New York, NY: St. Martins Press, 1996]) in taking aim at Hayami and 
Kikuchi's characterization in Asian Village Economy at the Crossroads of North Subang as a "traditional
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At the time of the baseline studies, agrarian differentiation was far advanced in 
both villages, with landownership heavily concentrated in a few hands. At least 70 
percent of households did not own cultivable land, and relatively few of these gained 
access to land through renting or sharecropping. In common with studies in these and 
other villages, the authors point to the importance of nonagricultural incomes that 
reinforced the inequality in landholdings.16 Many large landowners were also engaged 
in lucrative forms of accumulation outside agriculture, such as trade, transport, and 
money lending. At the same time, large numbers of men from landless households 
were engaged in insecure, poorly remunerated forms of labor circulation between the 
villages and the Jabotabek megalopolis.17
Processes of agrarian differentiation and labor circulation have long been in train, 
the authors argue, but they appear to have accelerated during the boom years of the 
1990s, particularly in North Subang, where agriculture is relatively more important. In 
1990, a third of all North Subang households had one or more members working 
exclusively or predominantly outside agriculture. By 1998, the proportion had risen to 
65 percent at the same time as the number of households grew from 216 to 261. The 
local economy of East Cirebon is more diversified, but even so Breman and Wiradi 
point to large and growing numbers of households dependent on the income earned 
by male migrants to Jabotabek. These "labor nomads" bore the brunt of the sharp 
contraction of economic activity following the collapse of the rupiah in the second half 
of 1997. Driven back from cities, many of them continued to make desperate (and 
largely unsuccessful) forays to urban areas in search of livelihood.
Women pursued work through a different kind of labor migration, as opportunities 
for domestic and factory-based female labor opened up overseas. Whether to Saudi 
Arabia, Singapore, or Korea, young women were traveling away from home on two- 
and three-year contracts, particularly from North Subang. One striking aspect of this 
trend is that this long-distance female labor force (called Tenaga Kerja Wanita, or TKW) 
consisted of the daughters and wives of well-off villagers as well as women from the 
poor and middle classes.18 In what is perhaps the most original contribution of the 
book, the authors provide a compelling account of the systems of labor brokerage, how 
aspiring workers must pay to attend courses to prepare them to give their labor, and 
the hardships and abuse many of these women endure. At the same time, the
village." Breman demonstrated in an earlier, landmark article that many "corporate" villages in Java were 
constructed by the Dutch; see The Village on Java and the Colonial State, CASP Series 1 (Rotterdam: Erasmus 
University, 1980). Village consolidation was also a tactic for forest consolidation in teak areas, as shown in 
Peluso, Rich Forests, Poor People.
16 For example, Hart, Power, Labor, and Livelihood; Chris Manning, "Review of Good Times and Bad Times in 
Rural Java," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 39,3 (2003): 369-81; Benjamin White and Gunawan 
Wiradi, Agrarian Reform in Comparative Perspective: Policy Issues and Research Needs (The Hague: Institute of 
Social Studies; Bogor: Agro-Economic Survey Foundation, 1984); Paul Alexander, Peter Boomgaard, and 
Ben White, eds., In the Shadow of Agriculture: Non-Farm Activities in the Javanese Economy, Past and Present 
(Amsterdam: Royal Tropical Institute, 1991).
17 "Jabotabek" refers to the geographically and economically interlocked urban-industrial areas of Jakarta, 
Bogor, Tangerang, and Bekasi.
18 Although there are some opportunities for men, they are far fewer and seem to require relatively high 
levels of skill. In mid-1998, according to Breman and Wiradi, fifty-seven women and eight men from 
North Subang were working abroad.
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plummeting value of the rupiah meant that, despite the fraudulent practices of many 
labor brokers, workers could often command substantial resources on their return. 
Breman and Wiradi were unable to explore the implications of these processes for 
gender relations, but observe that this is a crucial question for future research.
Illustrated with fine photographs of everyday life in the two villages, Good Times 
and Bad Times conveys a vivid sense of the harsh conditions in which millions of 
Javanese struggled to secure a livelihood even at the height of the economic boom, and 
of the widespread dislocation and suffering brought about by the sharp economic 
contraction of the late 1990s. It also confirms earlier studies that pointed to the 
advanced state of differentiation in lowland rice regions, and calls into question claims 
that workers expelled from jobs in cities and towns were simply reabsorbed into the 
agricultural economy through "poverty-sharing" mechanisms.
No doubt there are those who will maintain that the two villages are not 
necessarily "representative" of rural Java, that the quantitative evidence could be made 
to tell a different story, and that the more optimistic scenario suggested by official 
statistics cannot be dismissed so readily. Chris Manning (whom the authors explicitly 
take to task) makes some of these arguments in his review of Good Times and Bad Times, 
in which he finds fault with their use of quantitative data and the conclusions they 
draw from it.19 In contrast, Jonathan Pincus contends that "in their salient 
characteristics these locations are more illustrative of present-day conditions than the 
view of the Javanese village as a tightly-knit, insular rural community still common in 
policy circles."20
The debate provoked by the book evokes a powerful sense of d£jh vu—indeed, it is 
yet another iteration of a debate that has been going on since the 1970s between those 
who invoke aggregate statistics to present a generally optimistic picture, and those 
who draw on village studies to make far more pessimistic claims. "Macro optimists" 
frequently dismiss "micro pessimists" on the grounds that they are unrepresentative— 
and, to the extent that village studies ground their claims simply or primarily in 
quantitative indicators, they are vulnerable to this accusation. Yet statistically 
"representative" indicators can often be interpreted in different ways, depending on 
the assumptions about social relations and institutions. For example, Hart21 showed 
how the interpretation of aggregate survey data on trends in employment, income 
distribution, and poverty in Java during the 1970s hinged crucially on assumptions 
about labor markets—and that one could tell very different stories depending on 
which "model" one used.22 The strength of the Breman and Wiradi volume lies in its 
historical depth and detail and its firm grounding in local studies that shed light on 
and give substance to underlying processes linking "rural" and "urban" areas.
19 Manning, "Review of Good Times and Bad Times in Rural ]ava," pp. 369-81.
20 Pincus, "Review of Good Times and Bad Times in Rural ]ava," p. 773.
21 Hart, Power, Labor, and Livelihood.
22 In Gillian Hart, Andrew Turton, and Benjamin White, eds., Agrarian Transformations: Local Processes and 
the State in Southeast Asia (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989), a group of scholars— 
including Wiradi—who had been engaged in intensive longitudinal studies in different lowland rice 
regions of Southeast Asia grappled with precisely the question of what sort of claims could be made from 
these studies.
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Yet it is also the case that, like the earlier literature on agrarian change in Java, Good 
Times and Bad Times remains resolutely focused on the lowland rice regions, and the 
broad claims in Breman's "Prologue" ignore conditions in—and connections to— 
upland and forest regions. Partly in reaction to the lowland rice-centric character of 
work in the 1970s and early 1980s, there has emerged a significant literature pointing to 
some quite different social and environmental processes in upland and forest regions 
of Java. For example, an important volume edited by Tania Li23 explicitly addressed 
many of the issues of land, labor, and state interventions raised by Hart et al.24 The 
authors in that volume demonstrated that political economic conditions and 
livelihoods in Indonesia's uplands have developed not separately but through 
interactions with lowland peoples and processes, state practices and programs, and 
national and international markets.25 It is partly in relation to these "other" rural Javas 
that we address our comments in the remainder of this paper.
First, however, we discuss some of our own impressions on revisiting the coastal 
plain in relation to the picture painted by Breman and Wiradi. Then, after a brief 
examination of teak forests and West Java's mountain uplands, we return to the larger 
question of how an expanded view of "rural Java" helps shed light on the limits on 
political mobilization in lowland rice-producing regions, even in the wake of major 
changes to the political landscape.
Power, Labor, and Livelihood: Sukodono Revisited26
Officially Sukodono is no longer a "village" (desa), but an "urban" kelurahan. 
According to Wiradi, this shift took place in the 1980s when the old lurah (by 
definition, a strong supporter of Suharto's ruling Golkar party) lost the election, and a 
lurah from outside the village was brought in. There are now fourteen full-time
23 Tania Murray Li, ed., Transforming the Indonesian Uplands (Halifax: Harwood Academic Publications, 
1999).
24 Hart et al., Agrarian Transformations. Besides authors included in the Li volume (see n. 23), others 
debating agrarian change in Java's uplands include J. G. L. Palte, The Development of Java's Rural Uplands in 
Response to Population Growth (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1985); Lucas and Warren, "The 
State, the People, and their Mediators"; Robert Hefner, The Political Economy of Mountain Java: An 
Interpretive History (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990); Noer Fauzi, Petani and Penguasa: 
Dinamika Perjalanan Politik Agraria Indonesia (Yogyakarta: Institute for Social Transformation (INSIST),
KPA with Pustaka Pelajar, 1999); Dianto Bachriadi, Erpan Faryadi, and Bonnie Setyawan, Reformasi 
Agraria: Perubahan Politik, Sengketa, dan Agenda Pembaruan Agraria di Indonesia (Jakarta: Lembaga Penerbit 
FE-UI dan KPA, 1997). On agrarian change in forests in Java, see, e.g., Peluso, Rich Forests, Poor People; 
Hasanu Simon, Pengelolaan Hutan Bersama Rakyat: Teori dan Aplikasi di Hutan Jati Jawa (Yogyakarta: Bigraf, 
1999); San Afri Awang, Dekonstruksi Sosial Forestri: Reposisi Masyarakat dan Keadilan Lingkungan 
(Yogyakarta: BIGRAF Publishing and Program Pustaka, 2004); and I. Nyoman Nurjaya, Magersari: 
Dinamika Komunitas Petani-Pekerja Hutan dalam Perspektif Antropologi Hukum (Malang: Universitas Negeri 
Malang, 2005).
25 Li, Transforming the Indonesian Uplands, p. 5.
26 The discussion in this section is a summary of Gillian Hart, "Power, Labor, and Livelihood: Notes and 
Reflections on a Village Revisited," University of California International and Area Studies, Global Field 
Notes, Paper no. 2, December 2004, http: / / repositories.cdlib.org/ucias/gfn/2
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government officials installed in a large set of offices at the entrance to Sukodono, 
attesting to what appears to be a heavy bureaucratization of local government.27
From one perspective, Sukodono can now be seen as a suburb of Kendal, which has 
expanded from a sleepy coastal town to a major commercial center in what has become 
a heavily industrialized section of the north coast. The most striking visual change is 
the dramatic improvement in the housing stock. In the 1970s, the size and physical 
condition of a house provided a fairly accurate indicator of a household's 
landholding—large brick and tile houses for large landowners, wooden structures with 
concrete floors for small landowners, and woven bamboo walls and mud floors for the 
landless. A very large proportion of houses have been rebuilt with brick and tile, and 
several mansions now adorn the entrance to the village. Yet the residential area is still 
surrounded by large expanses of pristine sawah (rice fields), on which yields have more 
than trebled since the mid-1970s. Any dividing line between "the rural" and "the 
urban" has, in other words, become totally blurred.
Part of what is significant about Sukodono's having been designated a kelurahan is 
that it released twenty-seven hectares of highly productive sawah, the salary lands 
(tanah bengkok) that were formerly used to compensate village government officials 
(pamong desa). We were told that the land is now auctioned by district (kabupaten) 
officials for what appeared to be relatively low rental rates. On a visit to Kendal in 
1990, Gunawan Wiradi observed kabupaten officials openly divvying up the proceeds of 
tanah bengkok rentals among themselves. In the course of our recent visit, one of our 
informants spoke about the emergence of a mafia tanah (land mafia) in Sukodono, 
comprised of about twenty individuals, all local residents, who prevent others from 
bidding on the land at auction, and then rent it out at a profit to other Sukodono 
residents. The mafia tanah and its connections with supragovernment officials seem to 
represent a new twist on the close connections between large landowners and 
supravillage officials to which Hart drew attention in her earlier work—a point to 
which we return below.
What, then, of broader patterns of differentiation? In the mid-1970s, the 
landowning structure of the village was more or less as follows:28 (a) relatively large 
landowners—those with a hectare or more of rice land—constituted 9-10 percent of 
households and controlled in the vicinity of 60 percent of the land, as well as most of 
the lucrative tambaks (fish or shrimp ponds); (b) small landowners (those who owned 
at least 0.2 ha) formed 36-40 percent of the population and controlled less than 40 
percent of the village land; and (c) landless and near-landless households accounted 
for over 50 percent of households. At that time, a fairly large number of small 
landowning households had fallen into debt—mainly as a consequence of pest 
infestation of high-yielding rice varieties—and many had entered into complex 
relations of indebtedness with large landowners. Especially common in this village 
was a system through which a small landowning household would pawn its land to a
27 "Kelurahan" is the term for the smallest administrative unit in urban areas; "desa" is the term for the 
smallest administrative unit in rural areas. The significance in the change of Sukodono from a desa to a 
kelurahan is in the selection and politics of its leadership. Desa heads are elected by villagers, while heads 
of kelurahan (lurah) are appointed by district heads (bupati). The word " lurah" however is still used in some 
rural villages to refer to their administrative heads.
28 See Hart, Power, Labor, and Livelihood, p. 96, for a measure of control over land that included ownership, 
renting, and sharecropping arrangements.
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large landowner, and then pay back the debt by working on the land and handing over 
a large share of the crop—typically in the vicinity of two-thirds. Yet, at the same time, 
what often happened was that small landowners would gain preferential access to 
wage labor on the other sawah and tambaks of large landowners. There emerged what 
Hart called a system of exclusionary labor arrangements: lacking the means to enter 
these interlocking relations of land, labor, and indebtedness, many men and women 
belonging to landless households frequently earned lower wages—particularly in 
periods of off-peak demand for agricultural labor.
Differential access to, and control over, nonagricultural income sources also fed 
into growing inequality. Several large landowners were expanding into lucrative 
activities such as trading and transport—often by parlaying their close relations with 
supravillage government officials into licenses and contracts—while many desperately 
poor landless households got by through supplementing their agricultural wages with 
long hours spent in activities such as gathering snails, wood, and grass, weaving mats, 
and petty trade that yielded extremely low returns.
While it is both impossible and irresponsible to make any sort of definitive claims 
about social differentiation in Sukodono on the basis of our very brief visit, there were 
several indications—in addition to the presence of the mafia tanah—of the consolidation 
of the large landowning class. Consider first the statistical "facts" with which we were 
presented. Official population data suggest a population increase of around 45 percent 
since the mid-1970s, from 2,149 to 3,169. According to a village government official, 
some 70 percent of the approximately six hundred-plus households do not own any 
rice land—an increase of 20 percent since the mid-1970s. Of those who do own land, he 
estimated average landholding to be 0.5 ha. We then pointed out there are at least 250 
hectares of rice land in Sukodono—excluding the tanah bengkok—and that if 180 to 200 
households still own land, the average for the village is over one hectare. At that point 
he conceded that there is a smaller group of perhaps twenty to thirty households that 
own considerably more than a hectare, and that several of them have extensive 
landholdings in other villages.
Although several people complained that farming became less profitable after 
Reformasi, the indications are that rice production remains a lucrative source of 
accumulation, as well as a major source of employment—despite its becoming 
increasingly mechanized.29 At the same time, nonagricultural income sources outside 
the village appear to have expanded significantly—along with the fairly sharp rise in 
the number and proportion of "landless" households.
There has been a massive expansion of industry and urbanization in this region of 
Java, and many of the people with whom we spoke attested to large numbers of 
younger men and women from Sukodono having been drawn into nonagricultural 
employment outside the village. What also became clear, however, is that industrial
29 A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that, on an annual basis, mechanized land preparation in 
Sukodono has replaced 11,200 male labor days—amounting to a total wage bill of Rp. 224 million (about 
$25,000). Transplanting is still done by women workers, but pesticide use means that there is relatively 
little weeding. Harvesting is organized by brokers who bring in labor gangs, each comprised of about ten 
men, who are paid in cash. In dollar terms, agricultural wages seem to have increased from less than $1 a 
day in the mid-1970s to around $2 a day. The differential narrows if one takes account of food 
supplements to the cash wage, which were fairly common in the 1970s, but seem to be rare nowadays.
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jobs in the region have become increasingly scarce and insecure in recent years. Several 
different conversations suggested that two large factories in the vicinity have been the 
major source of industrial employment for young men and women from Sukodono— 
PT Kayu Lapis Indonesia, a plywood factory that processes logs rolled in from 
Kalimantan, and Texmaco, which is a large producer of synthetic textiles—both of 
which have shed large numbers of workers.30
In short, industrial capitalism has turned out to be a very shaky proposition for the 
incipient industrial proletariat of Sukodono. In the face of shrinking jobs in the regional 
economy, working abroad seems to have become the major source of nonagricultural 
income for many younger women and smaller numbers of men—precisely the process 
of Tenaga Kerja Wanita (TKW) documented by Breman and Wiradi in North Subang. 
Estimates of how many Sukodono villagers had entered into these contracts varied 
between thirty and one hundred. We were told of women going to Malaysia, 
Singapore, Saudi Arabia, Dubai, Taiwan, and Korea to work as domestic servants, as 
well as men working in some of these places as drivers and factory workers. The 
official version of the story that we were told at the Kelurahan office emphasized that 
many women have achieved “sukses" (success), returning to Sukodono with millions of 
rupiah that they use to rebuild houses, and in some instances to rent or purchase rice 
land; indeed, several people noted that much of the housing renovation had been 
financed by TKW. Another informant presented a more critical assessment of TKW, 
pointing to instances of sexual abuse as well as the recruitment and "training" fees that 
workers have to pay to brokers—precisely the issues that Breman and Wiradi raise.
Obviously these brief impressions raise many more questions than they answer— 
especially in terms of the possibilities and limits on political mobilization. Taken in 
conjunction with insights from Breman and Wiradi's book, however, the Sukodono 
revisit does suggest some avenues for further inquiry.
One of these is the question of how gender and class are being rearticulated in 
relation to one another, especially in the context of growing numbers of women and 
men moving back and forth between "villages" such as Sukodono and other places 
within and beyond Indonesia. Breman and Wiradi argue that the rapid expansion of 
employment niches, at short or longer distances away from home, helped to lower 
pressure building up in the rural economy. They also note that those working outside 
the village have become less susceptible to the economic and social power of village 
elites. Yet the potentials for—and limits upon—political mobilization among, what 
appears to be, an increasingly mobile working class remain open questions in the era of 
Reformasi.
A closely related question concerns the character of the large landowning class, 
especially in the lowland rice regions. Hart argued that, in Sukodono in the 1970s, the 
large landowning class was increasingly being incorporated in supravillage structures 
of state power, and Breman and Wiradi reiterate the importance of state patronage 
during the New Order in the villages where they worked. A key issue is how these 
relations are changing. While Breman and Wiradi do not explore this issue in any 
detail, they do observe that
30 See Hart, "Notes and Reflections," for a fuller discussion of what has happened to these two companies.
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the campaign in favour of reformasi in the two villages was not led by 
representatives of the land poor and landless majority, but by leaders from the 
dissenting faction among the local elite who saw an opportunity to turn the table 
against those who had kept them out of power and who used to monopolize the 
gains attached to it...What seems to be at stake is fierce competition among the 
local power contenders in a continuation of rivalries that have existed for 
generations.31
Not surprisingly, we left Sukodono with many more questions than answers— 
including whether and how old political rivalries are playing out in the context of the 
transformation of Sukodono into an urban kelurahan, along with the rise of the mafia 
tanah and what seems to be the expansion of lucrative forms of nonagricultural 
accumulation. What did seem clear, though, is that a powerful and well-connected 
class of local capitalists remained firmly in place—and would represent a powerful 
local force against activists seeking to organize the landless.
Rich Forests, Poor People: Twenty Years Later
In contrast to the visit to Sukodono, a return to the teak forest village "Sukawana" 
and the hamlet of "Pinggiran," where Peluso lived and conducted research in the mid- 
1980s, revealed few changes in the formal structuring of the village.32 The current lurah 
had been a young teacher in 1985, while the current hamlet head is the son of the 
hamlet head or kamituwo of that time. The old kamituwo was unusually beloved and 
respected by his fellow villagers, largely because he defended them against forest 
authorities when conflicts and forest operasi33 took place.34
The drive to Sukawana, in the heart of the prime teak forest zone that straddles the 
dry limestone hills of Central and East Java, took us off the paved road from Blora 
down a hardened forest road for ten kilometers or so. We traveled another few 
kilometers to Pinggiran. Pinggiran's persistent poverty seemed all too familiar, if not 
worse, despite changes in political regimes. Unlike Sukawana's central hamlet, 
Pinggiran still has no electricity and experiences severe water shortages every dry
31 Breman and Wiradi, Good Times and Bad Times in Rural Java, p. 304. In Sukodono, at the time of Hart's 
research, there were similarly fierce contentions between the family of the old lurah and that of the carik 
(village secretary), a supporter of NU (Nahdlatul Islam) whose son had played a key role in setting up a 
popular health program in the village that the old lurah managed to undermine. As mentioned earlier, a 
lurah from outside the village was brought in when the old lurah lost the election for Golkar. The sons of 
both the old lurah and the carik remain in Sukodono—although only the latter has become a civil servant 
(pegawai negeri) in local government.
32 "Sukawana" and "Pinggiran" are pseudonyms. Note that in Peluso's book, Rich Forests, Poor People, she 
could not identify the teak forest villages with detailed ethnography because of security issues.
33 "Operasi" is shorthand for the SWAT-team-like sweeps of forest villages suspected of teak theft. They 
were organized by Perhutani (the State Forestry Corporation—see below) and included armed
riot/ internal security police from BRIMOB POLRI (Brigade Mobile Polisi Republik Indonesia, Police 
Mobile Brigade). Members of local government were also supposed to be involved, but many managed to 
avoid direct participation, or, even better, to pay off the foresters to stay away. See Peluso, Rich Forests,
Poor People, pp. 226-29.
34 His son was elected recently, almost unanimously, by the hamlet residents after a short period under a 
less well-liked leader.
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season. The hamlet is separated from all the other hamlets in Sukawana by forest, 
although it abuts two hamlets administratively located in East Java districts. The East 
Java hamlets have fared better over the years, boasting electricity and paved access 
roads. Even in this brief visit, we saw that Perhutani (The State Forestry Corporation)35 
still shaped local capacities to survive and even to imagine—or mobilize around— 
alternative local livelihood strategies.
Housing stock was about the same; there were a few newly tiled roofs and a few 
more TVs and DVD players, powered by homemade electrical (battery) generators. 
The predominant housing material was still teak wood and, like before, not of the fine 
quality seen in yachts, parquet floors, and Perhutani's regional branch offices. There 
were also considerably more houses. As we walked around with old friends and 
informants from the village, they pointed out some forty new houses squeezed into the 
well-defined borders that separate the village from the state-managed forest. The 
kamituwo told us that the number of households had nearly doubled, from seventy-five 
in 1985 to 140 in 2004. Even the kamituwo did not live in an opulent manner, despite his 
two years' working in a photo shop in Malang. His large but sparely furnished house 
had a dirt floor, and his salary lands included no sawah, consisting instead of 1.5 
hectares of dry fields (tegalan)—the only dry fields in the hamlet.
Strikingly absent from this teak forest were the great trees of twenty years ago. In 
1985, travelers on these roads from Blora or Cepu were surrounded by huge teak trees. 
They filled the horizon, hiding the undulating hills. On this trip, we passed an 
occasional large tract, but many more were in early stages of reforestation or were 
apparently abandoned. The extremely young age of most of the teak forest was now 
typical, according to Edi, a forestry student and member of the NGO ARuPA (Aliansi 
Relawan untuk Penyelamatan Alam, Volunteer Alliance for Saving Nature), who 
accompanied us to Pinggiran. The trees surrounding Sukawana and Pinggiran had 
been sixty-years old in 1985, slated for harvest at the usual eighty-year rotation, which 
had taken place more or less on time in 2000. But in addition to the planned cut, many 
other trees—and whole tracts—had been cut "illegally."
Our first thought was that the loss of these forest resources resulted from the 
explosion of a time bomb of repression and forbidden forest access.36 Not long after 
Suharto was forced to resign, the newspapers and internet were filled with stories of 
massive cutting (illegal logging) throughout the teak zone and other forests of Java. 
But with first-class teak logs valued at over $800 per cubic meter in 2001, and mature 
trees consisting of four-five cubic meters or more, the trees Perhutani cared most about 
were in the teak forest.37 In 2001, Perhutani was bankrupt, due to the losses of 
thousands of teak trees and forest damage.38 Surpluses from teak production and
35 Perhutani is a type of Indonesian state-owned enterprise. Under the Ministry of Forestry, Perhutani 
foresters directly manage the majority of state forests on Java—some 2.5 million hectares.
36 See the discussion of this in Peluso, Rich Forests, Poor People.
37 This estimate comes from CIFOR News On Line, no. 33, August 5, 2003,
http: / / www.cifor.cgiar.org/ docs/_pf/ l/_ref/ publications/ newsonline/33/hardwood.htm.
38 Although accounts vary, one source (CIFOR) claims that "log thefts in Central Java amounted to 880,000 
teak trees in 1998, 2.4 million in 1999, 2.1 million trees in 2000... In the Sukabumi, district the level of 1999 
log thefts equalled the entire planned production for the period 2000 to 2002." See, "Leveling the Playing 
Field," CIFOR, August 31, 2004, at http: / / www.cifor.cgiar.org/lpf/_ref/lpf/project/fieldsites.htm.
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processing in Central and East Java had subsidized management of the protection and 
lower-value production forests of montane Java, including their more recently 
acquired forests of West Java.39
Pinggiran villagers explained the tree cutting differently—and they were backed 
up in their assessments by NGO and activist research.40 Although centuries of 
enclosure and exclusion contributed to the underlying causes of the timber-cutting 
riots, the killing of several villagers by forest rangers triggered the rush to cut the trees. 
One victim of Perhutani violence was from an adjacent village.41 His killing was 
notorious for having happened on privately held village land, that is, not on state 
forest land. Upon hearing of this abrogation of the local "rules of engagement," 
villagers joined in the violence against state property, destroying both the "legal" and 
"illegal" sources of their livelihoods. The village was hit the hardest, not by the loss of 
formal logging opportunities, but by the loss of "informal" ones. Logging only once 
every eighty years provided relatively few laboring opportunities at long intervals, 
whereas occasional illegal cutting or "appropriation" could take place any time.
On the other hand, reforestation opportunities increased when production 
eventually started up again. Reforestation entailed the allocation of plots, or persil, to 
villagers for two years at the beginning of the trees' life cycle. In a kind of 
sharecropping called tumpang sari, farmers were allowed two years' access to land to 
plant field crops between the rows of teak seedlings they planted for Perhutani. They 
could farm until the canopy of the broad-leaved teak trees blocked the sun.
Clearly, what differentiates these forest villages from lowland rice villages such as 
Sukodono, North Subang, and East Cirebon are the forest and the unique form of state 
presence. State forestland takes up 80 percent of Sukawana's village territory, 
dramatically illustrating the notion of the state as landlord.42 This percentage is high 
even for Blora district—which has some 44 percent of its land under state forest. 
Perhutani is not only the biggest landlord, but also the successor to the colonial 
institutions of dispossession and enclosure. These forests were demarcated and 
mapped as far back as the 1880s. Even in the face of bankruptcy, Perhutani has hung 
onto its landholdings in Java—a whopping 19-21 percent of the island's land 
(depending on how it is counted). Our interviews with foresters and forest village 
advocacy groups suggested that the "independent" state enterprise is being subsidized 
by the Ministry of Forestry's revenues from other parts of Indonesia.43
A second form of differentiation of land holdings in Sukawana is geographic. 
Among the five hamlets of Sukawana, Pinggiran is the most land poor.44 The hamlet 
has only thirty hectares of sawah and no tegalan except the salary land of the hamlet
39 Peluso, Rich Forests, Poor People.
40 See, for example, "A Letter to Perhutani" Down to Earth, No. 60, February 2004.
41 Pinggiran villagers identified him as being "from here," however.
42 Jiken Subdistrict Office, Blora, Central Java, Kecamatan Jiken Dalam Angka (2002), typescript of report held 
in Jiken Subdistrict Office, Blora, Central Java.
43 The symbolic power of Perhutani's relatively strong legal controls on land, particularly in the teak areas, 
appears to be worth a great deal to the Ministry of Forestry.
44 This extreme dependence on both the forest and the forestry establishment led Peluso to select Pinggiran 
hamlet for research in 1985.
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head, a fact that is often cited as evidence of the hamlet's poverty.45 Sukawana, in total, 
has 195 hectares of sawah, most of which is in the central hamlet, and some rich farmers 
own three or more hectares of this land. A hectare in 2004 was valued at about Rp. 100 
million. Farmers still use cattle to plow their sawah (rather than the hand tractors seen 
in many parts of the coastal rice zone).46 Differentiation in landholdings among the 
residents of Pinggiran was impossible to investigate in this short trip. Several 
informants told us that most of the thirty hectares of sawah are still held in one-quarter 
to one-half hectare holdings, as was the case in 1985. Although among landholders 
differentiation may be less than the general pattern, by any accounting, many 
households remain landless.
Obviously, off-farm employment must supplement livelihoods, and both the forest 
itself and Perhutani dominate the opportunities for employment. Reforestation by 
tumpang sari is conceived of as "agricultural" and likely accounts for the large numbers 
of people who call themselves "farmers" rather than "agricultural laborers."47 Men 
work at logging, dragging logs with draft animals, loading and driving trucks, and 
other heavy work. Women in this area not only weed, plant, and harvest, but also hoe 
(icangkul)—hoeing is backbreaking work that in many other regions is reserved for 
men. Following Perhutani, wages and hours worked are the same for forest labor and 
agricultural labor, with women's labor valued less than men's. Women's wages were 
currently Rp. 10,000 a day compared to Rp. 15,000 for men. Working hours had not 
changed; everyone worked relatively long days from 7 a.m. to 4 p.m., with an hour off 
for lunch. The loss of forest and the subsequent shortage of logs, added to gendered 
wage discrepancies, have made women more employable both on private land and in 
forest work. More women than men now work for Perhutani, as day laborers in 
nurseries and seedling plots. In addition, women generally applied for access to persil 
and did the bulk of the work. Every one of the eighteen women who sat talking with 
us in the evening currently worked a persil ranging in size from one-quarter hectare to 
one hectare at Perhutani's nearby reforestation site.
As in the lowland rice villages, labor migration, particularly by women, 
supplements local livelihoods. Some young women have become TKW in Singapore, 
Medan, and Kalimantan. Sending girls away to labor elsewhere was not entirely new 
to this area. In the mid-1980s, labor brokers or "relatives" from Jakarta and Surabaya 
showed up in the village several times seeking young girls for domestic help. As 
young women in the 1980s, some of the now-married women of Pinggiran had worked 
as prostitutes in the towns of Blora, Cepu, and Bojonegoro—forest district centers—or 
as decoys for the forest rangers while village men were appropriating teak. Many 
others collected nontimber forest products during the dry season and sold them in the 
markets or to middlemen who came to the village.
Social relations between higher-level officials and poor villagers—particularly 
those in Pinggiran—had not improved much. On our way out of the village, we
45 One of the adjacent hamlets, on the East Java side, provides its hamlet head with some three hectares of 
sawah, and he lives ostentatiously.
46 Moreover, the bocah angon (young boys who are cattle herders), an institution that forestry professor 
Hasanu Simon has reported as disappearing (personal communication, 2004), is still alive and well in this 
village.
47 See, for example, Kecamatan Jiken Dalam Angka (2002).
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stopped to talk briefly to the new lurah and some others. Sitting on the veranda of his 
house, constructed (of course) of teak, with roof tiles and floor tiles, he told us of an 
impending harvest of a tract of mature teak remaining in the village territory. He said 
he had negotiated with Perhutani for two "concessions" that formerly would have 
been unheard of: a percentage of the harvest value paid to the village, and access to the 
land between the trees for persil during at least one year of the girdling period. 
Girdling—a practice where the bark is cut off in a circle around the bottom of the 
tree—kills the tree and enables the teak to dry standing. This renders straighter wood 
fibers, logs that are easier to mill, and higher prices. Girdling lasts for two years and is 
a time of high risk for theft. Perhutani considers parking villagers in persil under the 
girdled trees risky as well. This concession was thus something of a coup.
More suggestive of other agendas and continuities with the past was his "plan" for 
the Rp. 17 billion (approximately US$1,700,000.00) he anticipated as the village's share 
of the harvest. He would not use it toward paving the road to Pinggiran, or toward 
extending electricity to outlying hamlets, or to digging wells for the many people in the 
outlying hamlets who could not afford them. His idea, which he said came from 
conversations with "his people," was to have a big celebration with music and other 
performances for August 17 that year (Indonesian Independence Day). He had no 
comments about how the money left over after (even a large) celebration would be 
used.
Given the dearth of new employment opportunities and the change in the contents 
of the "forest" landscape, it was even more striking that there was no evidence or hint 
of organizing or activism to create alternative patterns of management or ownership of 
these areas. Long-term land occupations had not followed the cutting of teak trees. 
When we tried to broach the possibility of there being alternatives to Perhutani 
management, villagers met our suggestions incredulously. No activists had tried to 
organize these villagers, nor had any foresters tried to establish a working community 
management or social forestry scheme with these heavily forest-dependent villagers. 
Rather, the land lay unworked for several years following the mass cutting. One day 
several years later, a planting foreman from Perhutani came through and asked if 
anyone was interested in taking persil—the time had come to reforest. Most Pinggiran 
villagers jumped at the opportunity.
We now turn to a short discussion of agrarian change in the uplands of West Java, 
where political and economic conditions have taken a radically different turn than in 
either the teak zone or the northern coastal wet-rice-growing regions.
The Rise of Agrarian Movements in the Pasundan Region of West Java
Like other regions of Java, the upland areas are plagued by increasing land 
concentration, intensifying pressure on resources, and under- and unemployment of a 
growing labor force. In a twist more reminiscent of the teak forest than the lowland rice 
areas, the most prominent landlords in these uplands are state and private plantation 
companies and Perhutani. Although some old plantation lands were redistributed 
under land reform initiatives in the early 1960s, the Suharto era brought back 
dispossession with a vengeance to the uplands. Old plantations were reallocated to 
new state or corporate managers, and Perhutani took over the management of the state
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forests from a weaker, regionally based state institution.48 Similar to the scenarios on 
the North Coast presented by Breman and Wiradi, and to what we observed in the 
vicinity of Sukodono, industrial factories and industrial agriculture are taking over 
increasing tracts of the uplands. Circular migration to Bandung and Jabotabek has also 
become common for men from the relatively nearby upland areas of West Java that we 
visited in July 2004 (specifically in Garut and Ciamis).
Strikingly different in these uplands, however, was the prominence of land 
occupations by thousands of landless and near-landless people—what Wiradi has 
termed "land reform by leverage."49 Land occupations began before 1998, but picked 
up speed later that year when Habibie, as interim president, replaced Suharto. KPA 
facilitated the early occupations by convening a meeting of local leaders in 1997, where 
both land occupations and post-Suharto political possibilities generated heated 
debates.50 After Suharto's fall, peasant organizations emerged in many areas of 
Indonesia, especially in Java.51 This growing agrarian movement swept the uplands of 
West Java and acquired greater legitimacy in the wake of President Abdurrachman 
Wahid's comment in March 2000 that people should not be accused of wrongly seizing 
land because, "in fact, the plantations have stolen the land of the people." He went on 
to say that "if all this time the nation has become rich from controlling and managing 
land and natural resources, then for the future the people should enjoy the same 
benefits."52 The Director General of the Department of Forestry and Plantations 
estimated that, as of September 2000, some 118,830 hectares of national estate land had 
been seized, along with 48,051 hectares of private estate lands.53
Of the places we traveled, only the upland villages of West Java had mobilized 
long-term land occupations (some having lasted over three years by the time of our
48 Until 1978, West Java's forests were largely managed by Dinas Kehutanan, or the Forest Service. For 
details on the histories of forest management institutions in Indonesia, see Tim Penyusun Sejarah, Sejarah 
Kehutanan Indonesia (Jakarta: Departemen Kehutanan, 1986).
49 See Gunawan Wiradi, "Pembaruan Agraria: Sebuah Tanggapan," in Reformasi Agraria, ed. Bachriadi et 
al.
50 Dianto Bachriadi and Anton Lucas, Merampas Tanah Rakyat: Kasus Tapos dan Cimacan (Jakarta: 
Kepustakaan Gramedia, 2001).
51 These include FSPI (Federasi Serikat Petani Indonesia, Federation of Indonesian Peasant Unions), SPP 
(Serikat Petani Pasundan), and SPJB (Serikat Petani Jawa Barat, West Java Peasants Union). We spent time 
with the founders and current leadership of SPP and some of its affiliated youth activist groups. For an 
excellent discussion of the rise of these new agrarian movements in West Java, see Lucas and Warren,
"The State, the People, and their Mediators."
52 Quoted by Imam Kuswahyono, "Mencari Format Hukum dalam Menuju Reforma Agraria dalam Kerangka 
Otonomi Daerah," http: / / www.otoda.or.id/Artikel/Imam%20Koeswahyono.htm, and cited in Noer Fauzi, 
"The New Sundanese Peasants' Union: Peasant Movements, Changes in Land Control, and Agrarian 
Questions in Garut, West Java" (paper prepared for "Crossing Borders" Workshop: "New and Resurgent 
Agrarian Questions in Post-Soeharto Indonesia and Post-Apartheid South Africa," Center for Southeast 
Asia Studies and Center for African Studies, Institute for International Studies, University of California, 
Berkeley, October 24, 2003, http:/ /repositories.cdlib.org/cseas/CSEASWP1-03/. The transcript of the 
workshop can be found at http: / / ias.berkeley.edu/cseas/Events/ AgrarianReformWorkshopA2- 
MINUTES.pdf.
53 Dianto Bachriadi, "Land for the Landless: Why Are The Democrats In Jakarta Not Interested In Land 
Reform?" Inside Indonesia 64 (Oct.-Dec. 2000).
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visit) on Perhutani or plantation land.54 In some cases, peasants on these occupied 
lands had sustained resistance to violent eviction by teams of national and regional 
police, forest police, and hired thugs. This recent history of organized agrarian 
movements in upland Java not only provides a stark contrast to histories of the 
lowland rice zones and the teak forest. It raises the question of why agrarian 
organization, mobilization, and movements have occurred in these uplands and not 
elsewhere, even though differentiation and a coercive state presence are more heavily 
felt in the lowland rice-producing zones and the teak forests. The state-as- 
dispossessor/landlord seems like an obvious explanation, but is insufficient on its 
own—as the section on the teak forest has indicated.
Although more research is needed, there are at least six conditions that may have 
contributed to the strength of agrarian organization in this region, and that work best 
in combination with one another. First, the NGOs and activists who connected with 
these upland villages were based in and around Bandung-Bogor-Jakarta and were 
comprised largely of middle-class student-intellectuals who generally professed a 
moderate, secular Islam, and were inspired to activism by the excesses of the late New 
Order state. Their initial field of focus was rural West Java. While their work was not 
limited to this region, there were site-specific contingencies that encouraged their 
continued local/regional engagement.55
Second, opportunities to organize may have been related to Islamic political and 
cultural configurations specific to the Pasundan region of West Java. The upland areas 
of Garut, Ciamis, and Tasikmalaya districts have a long history of rural Islamic 
schooling and practice.56 This region would have been positioned differently than the 
north coast rice villages and the teak forest during the PKI-led land reforms of the 
1960s and the subsequent agrarian violence of 1965-66, although PKI (Partai Komunis 
Indonesia, Indonesian Communist party) and BTI (Barisan Tani Indonesia, Indonesian 
Peasants' Front) did some organizing in this region as well.55 In addition, these upland 
areas—also known as the Priangan—historically had ambivalent relationships with 
national and colonial governments.
54 We heard about occupations of forest and plantation land in upland areas of Central Java from both 
KPA and ARuPA activists. Land occupation of Perhutani's forest by local people in Wonosobo Central 
Java, for instance, is explored in Dianto Bachriadi and Anton Lucas, "Hutan Milik Siapa? Upaya-Upaya 
Mewujudkan Forestry I and Reform di Kabupaten Wonosobo, Jawa Tengah," in Berebut Tanati: Beberapa 
Knjian Rumpus dan Rumpling, ed. Anu Lounela and Yando Zakaria (Yogyakarta: INSIST Press, 2002.)
55 See Lucas and Warren, "The State, the People, and their Mediators" for a more detailed explanation of 
the rise of these groups. Afiff et al., "Resurgent Agrarian Movements" discusses one set of recent activist- 
movement configurations in West Java. See also, Noer Fauzi, Memahami Gerakurt-gerukun Rukyut Dunia 
Ketiga (Yogyakarta: INSIST Press, 2005).
56 Tasikmalaya has more than nine hundred Islamic schools (pesantren and madrasah)—many times more 
than the number of secular government schools. It was also an important site during the Darul Islam 
rebellion in the late 1950s and early 1960s. On a history of the Darul Islam rebellion, which hoped to 
establish an Islamic state in early postcolonial Indonesia, see Cornelius van Dyke, Rebellion Under the 
Banner of Islam: Darul Islam in Indonesia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981 j. For a recent account of rural 
Islam in West Java, see Lynda Newland, "Under the Banner of Islam: Mobilising Religious Identities in 
West Java," The Australian Journal of Anthropology (August 2000): 1-11.
r” See, Newland, "Under the Banner of Islam." Darul Islam areas also had very different relations with the 
forest than PKI regions. See Peluso, Rich Forests, Poor People, pp. 103,191 -92.
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Third, compared to lowland rice villages, West Java upland villages were 
characterized by somewhat less differentiation. Nevertheless, differentiation was a 
significant process and proceeding apace, particularly where state or corporate entities 
had appropriated large tracts of land.
Fourth, the location of a subset of upland villages directly adjacent to tracts of 
upland forests and plantations provided them some potential (though inevitably 
temporary) relief from land hunger: through occupations. Further enabling these 
occupations is the fact that many of these upland forests in West Java are categorized 
as protection not production forests and Perhutani has historically paid less attention to 
these forests (by providing lower budget allocations and fewer forest guards) than to 
major production forests. Perhutani is also a relatively new landlord in this part of 
West Java, taking over from the provincial Forest Service (Dinas Kehutanan) only since 
1978. Perhutani thus had less power, less historical presence, and even less institutional 
legitimacy here than it enjoyed in the teak areas.
Fifth, having a weak state agency or a distant corporate entity as a local 
landlord/land concentrator is a less personal relationship than a situation where one's 
neighbor—possibly a family relation—is the landlord, so confrontation on these state- 
controlled lands was easier to mobilize and sustain in West Java than it was in the 
North Coast rice lowlands and teak forest areas.
Finally, activists and NGO leaders and organizations in this region themselves 
were inspired by and collaborated with national and international activists, NGOs, and 
academics focused on agrarian problems and poverty. Comparison with the teak areas 
is instructive. In the teak areas, NGOs tended to emerge from the ranks of either 
professional foresters-in-training or environmentalists. Although these committed 
individuals may have been concerned about the social inequities of forestry on Java 
and elsewhere in Indonesia, the philosophical and political tools they brought to their 
mobilization efforts were quite different. In particular, few of them were willing to 
mobilize people for radical land reform (for example, in the sense of redistribution) on 
state forests.
In addition, the specific histories of dispossession and agrarian change play hugely 
important roles in contemporary movement politics (or their absence). Although 
Perhutani is a relatively new and violent presence in West Java's uplands, in the teak 
areas, Perhutani continues a centuries-old history of a powerful state landlord with 
deep pockets and complex relations with local people. For a short historical moment, 
the agency was considering more inclusive management options even in the teak forest 
due in part to its bankruptcy and lack of immediate control in the early Reformasi years. 
Though not powerful enough to preclude rioting and the appropriation of its most 
valuable resources, the Perhutani foresters have otherwise disciplined people's 
everyday practices and acted to preclude real options for alternative management. 
Thus, despite the efforts of young forest activists to organize teak forest communities 
to manage these forests, in most cases, teak forest villagers have remained 
uninterested, returning to their own farms and forestry-controlled persil after the riots 
and rampages. In the few instances where the foresters have considered community 
management options, the financial benefits of these changes have not reached the 
villagers.
Revisiting "Rural" Java 195
This difference raises some difficult questions about the long-term potential for 
mobilization, particularly in comparison with the agricultural and forest areas in 
upland regions like Pasundan. It also highlights the persistence—yet with different 
forms and histories—of structural constraints on the rural poor observed by Breman, 
Wiradi, Hart, and others in the lowland rice areas.
Concluding Observations
What have we learned from situating Breman and Wiradi's arguments about 
ongoing differentiation in the lowland rice regions in relation to our brief (and 
undeniably) superficial impressions of changes going on in other regions of Java? 
Breman and Wiradi's book came out at a very particular moment—a time of 
tremendous change and speculation about Indonesian life after Suharto, appearing 
amid a flurry of questions about the long- and short-term consequences of krismon. 
Their study also coincided with the reemergence of peasant movements demanding 
access to land in other regions of Java—an enormously significant development, given 
the history of the PKI, the massacres of the 1960s, and the New Order's fierce 
repression of anything smacking of agrarian organization. The rise and at least the 
temporary achievements of these nascent agrarian movements in particular parts of 
Java, but not others, indicate active reworkings as well as continuities in historical 
processes.
In the 1970s and 80s, futurists predicted Java's eventual transformation to an urban 
island, but the persistence of rural spaces, livelihoods, and longings imply that such a 
future remains a fair way off. In this essay, we have pointed out a few of the 
connections between the diverse sites where "rural Java" has been located and 
positioned by a sampling of scholars and activists writing and operating in the area of 
agrarian and environmental change. The development of agrarian movements in 
particular parts of Java and not others cries out for new research, as do the diverse 
ways in which local and translocal forms of power and access to resources are playing 
out in the context of the decentralization of local and regional government. Also of 
great importance are the complex and changing relations between so-called rural and 
urban areas, and between Java and other regions of Indonesia. The transformations 
that have accompanied the movement of young women and men to workplaces in 
other regions of Indonesia, Asia, and the Middle East form another key area of 
research.
What we found perhaps most significant in our recent journey is the emergence of 
a new cadre of scholar-activists in Indonesia, intensely engaged in bringing together 
theory and practice and forging new understandings that bear directly on illuminating 
the possibilities of—as well as the limits on—agrarian change. Any effort to chart these 
developments has to acknowledge the absolutely central role of rural sociologist 
Gunawan Wiradi, together with his colleagues, Professor Sediono Tjondronegoro and 
Profesor Sajogyo, now retired, at Institut Pertanian Bogor. Through the dark days of 
the New Order, they remained firmly committed to principles of social justice and 
provided mentorship, protection, and inspiration for the new generation of scholar- 
activists.
